The connection between Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is further strengthened by providing a single proof that yields both results.
A Shared Proof
Let A denote a …nite set of alternatives and let L denote the set of strict linear orders, or (strict) rankings, on A: Let L ¤ denote the set of weak linear orders, or (weak) rankings, on A: Fix a positive integer N: A function f : L N ! A will be called a social choice function, while a function F : L N ! L ¤ will be called a social welfare function. A member of L N is called a pro…le of rankings (or simply a pro…le) and its ith component is called individual i's ranking. A member of L ¤ is called a social order, or society's ranking.
We say that a social choice function f : L N ! A is:
Pareto E¢cient if whenever alternative a is at the top of every individual i's ranking, L i ; then f (L 1 ; :::; L N ) = a. ¤ I wish to thank Vijay Krishna and Motty Perry for motivating the present note through a stimulating discussion of a short proof of Arrow's Theorem due to John Geanakoplos. Thanks also to Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin for helpful comments and to Matt Jackson and Roger Myerson for bringing to my attention the work of Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) , to Hugo Sonnenschein for directing me to the work of Barberà (1980 Barberà ( , 1983 and to Mark Satterthwaite for reminding me ofDictatorial if there is an individual i such that f(L 1 ; :::; L N ) = a if and only if a is at the top of i's ranking L i :
We say that a social welfare function F :
Pareto E¢cient if whenever alternative a is ranked above b according to each L i ; then a is ranked above b according to F (L 1 ; :::; L N ):
Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if whenever the ranking of a versus b is unchanged for each i = 1; :::; N when individual i's ranking changes from L i to L 0 i ; then the ranking of a versus b is the same according to both F (L 1 ; :::; L N ) and
Dictatorial if there is an individual i such that one alternative is ranked above another according to F (L 1 ; :::; L N ) whenever the one is ranked above the other according to
In what follows we shall employ essentially a single argument to prove two theorems (Theorems A and B below).
1 Theorem A is a version of the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem (Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) ), and it is well-known that it has as a corollary the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) ; see Section 2 below.
2 Theorem B is Arrow's theorem (Arrow (1963) ). While the two theorems are known to be closely related, the demonstration below, that e¤ectively a single proof yields both results, indicates that their logical underpinnings are in fact identical.
3
Of independent interest is that the proof below is both simple and direct. Consequently, Theorem A together with the Proposition in Section 2 provides a simple and direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.
4
The split-page presentation below is meant to highlight the essentially identical nature of the proofs of Theorems A and B. When reference to a …gure is made, the "social choice" column of the …gure applies to the proof of Theorem A, while the "social order" column of the …gure applies to the proof of Theorem B.
1 Our proof is inspired by the short and elegant proofs of Arrow's theorem due to Geanakoplos (1996) . 2 Another corollary of Theorem A is obtained by replacing the hypothesis of monotonicity with Nash implementability. This is because, as Eric Maskin has kindly reminded us, every Nash implementable social choice function is monotonic (see Maskin (1985) ). 3 The alert reader will notice that whenever monotonicity is used in the proof of Theorem A, strategy-proofness (see Section 2) would also have su¢ced. With this observation, one obtains sideby-side identical proofs of a version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (in which Pareto e¢ciency replaces the "onto" assumption) and Arrow's theorem. 4 The proof in Gibbard (1973) is indirect in that it relies on Arrow's theorem. In contrast, both Satterthwaite (1975) and Schmeidler and Sonnenschein (1978) contain direct proofs. Especially simple direct proofs can be found in Barberà (1983) , Benoît (1999a), and Sen (2000) . Barberà (1980) and Geanakoplos (1996) contain simple proofs of Arrow's theorem. Also highly recommended is Benoît (1999b) , which contains new impossibility results together with simple proofs for social choice correpondences both with and without lotteries.
Theorem A. If #A¸3 and f : L N ! A is Pareto e¢cient and monotonic, then f is a dictatorial social choice function.
Proof.
Step 1. Consider any two distinct alternatives a; b 2 A and a proi ‡e of rankings in which a is ranked highest and b lowest for every individual i = 1; :::; N: Pareto e¢ciency implies that the social choice at this pro…le is a:
Consider now changing individual 1's ranking by raising b in it one position at a time. By montonicity, the social choice remains equal to a so long as b is below a in 1's ranking. But when b …nally does rise above a, monotonicity implies that the social choice either changes to b or remains equal to a: If the latter occurs, then begin the same process with individual 2, then 3, etc. until for some individual n; the social choice does change from a to b when b rises above a in n's ranking. (There must be such an individual n because alternative b will eventually be at the top of every individual's ranking and by Pareto e¢ciency the social choice will then be b:) Figures 1 and 2 depict the situations just before and just after individual n's ranking of b is raised above a:¯T
satis…es Pareto e¢ciency and IIA, then F is a dictatorial social welfare function.
Proof.
Step 1. Consider any two distinct alternatives a; b 2 A and a proi ‡e of rankings in which a is ranked highest and b lowest for every individual i = 1; :::; N: Pareto e¢ciency implies that a is strictly at the top of the social order. Consider now changing individual 1's ranking by raising b in it one position at a time. By IIA, a remains at the top of the social order so long as b is below a in 1's ranking. But when b …nally does rise above a, IIA implies that a remains ranked above every alternative but perhaps b by the social order. If a does remain ranked above b; then begin the same process with individual 2, then 3, etc. until for some individual n; the social rank of b rises above a when b rises above a in n's ranking. (There must be such an individual n because alternative b will eventually be at the top of every individual's ranking and by Pareto e¢ciency b will then be socially ranked above a:) Figures 1 and 2 depict the situations just before and just after individual n's ranking of b is raised above a:
(The procedure used to …nd the pivotal individual n in this …rst step of both proofs is adapted from the ingenious procedure introduced in Geanakoplos (1996) .) Figure 2 ) by moving alternative a to the bottom of individual i's ranking for i < n and moving it to the second last position in i's ranking for i > n: We wish to argue that these changes do not a¤ect the socially top-ranked alternatives and that the social orders are as indicated in the …gures. Figure  2 0 is b; the social choice in Figure 1 0 must, by monotonicity, be either a or b: But if the social choice in Figure 1 0 is b; then by monotonicity, the social choice in Figure 1 must be b; a contradiction. Hence, the social choice in Figure 1 0 is a:
Step 3. Consider c 2 A distinct from a and b: Because the (otherwise arbitrary) pro…le of rankings in Figure 3 can be obtained from the Figure 1 0 pro…le without changing the ranking of a versus any other alternative in any individual's ranking, the social choice in Figure 3 must, by monotonicity, be a:¯F irst, note that b must, by IIA, be topranked by society in Figure 2 0 because it is top-ranked in Figure 2 Figure 1 0 remain socially ranked above every alternative but perhaps a: But if b is socially ranked at least as high as a in Figure 1 0 ; then by IIA, b would also be socially ranked at least as high as a in Figure 1 , a contradiction. Hence, a is socially ranked …rst and b second in Figure 1 0 :
Step 3 Step 4. Consider the pro…le of rankings in Figure 4 derived from the Figure 3 pro…le by interchanging the ranking of alternatives a and b for individuals i > n: Because this is the only di¤erence between the pro…les in Figures 3 and 4 , and because the social choice in Figure 3 is a; the social choice in Step 5. Note that an arbitrary pro…le of rankings with a at the top of individual n's ranking can be obtained from the pro…le in Figure 4 without reducing the ranking of a versus any other alternative in any individual's ranking. Hence, monotonicity implies that the social choice must be a whenever a is at the top of individual n's ranking. So, we may say that individual n is a dictator for alternative a: Because a was arbitrary, we have shown that for each alternative a 2 A, there is a dictator for a. But clearly there cannot be distinct dictators for distinct alternatives. Hence there is a single dictator for all alternatives.¯S tep 5. Consider an arbitrary pro…le of rankings with a above b in individual n's ranking. If necessary, alter the pro…le by moving alternative c between a and b in n's ranking and to the top of every other individual's ranking. By IIA this does not a¤ect the social ranking of a versus b: Because the ranking of a versus c for every individual is now as in Figure 4 , IIA implies that the social ranking of a is above c; which by Pareto e¢ciency is socially ranked above b. So, by transitivity, we may conclude that a is socially ranked above b whenever n ranks a above b: By repeating the argument with the roles of b and c reversed, and recalling that c was an arbitrary alternative distinct from a and b; we may conclude that the social ranking of a is above some alternative whenever n ranks a above that alternative. Thus, we may say that individual n is a dictator for a: Since a was an arbitrary alternative we have shown that for every alternative a 2 A; there is a dictator for a: But clearly there cannot be distinct dictators for distinct alternatives. Hence there is a single dictator for all alternatives.
Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Recall that a social choice function f :
The following Proposition and its proof are well known (see Muller and Satterthwaite (1977), or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) ). We include them here for completeness.
Proposition. If f : L
N ! A is strategy-proof and onto, then f is Pareto e¢cient and monotonic.
Proof. Suppose that f(L) = a and that for every alternative b, the ordering L Choose a 2 A: Because f is onto, f (L) = a for some L 2 L N : By monotonicity the social choice remains equal to a when a is raised to the top of every individual's ranking. But again by monotonicity, the social choice must remain a regardless of how the alternatives below a are ranked by each individual. Consequently, whenever a is at the top of every individual's ranking the social choice is a: Because a was arbitrary f is Pareto e¢cient.
Theorem A and the Proposition together yield the following result.
Corollary. (Gibbard-Satterthwaite) If #A¸3 and f : L N ! A is onto and strategy-proof, then f is dictatorial.
